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Introduction 
The essay addresses the question of the moral legitimacy of terrorism within the framework of a 
brief history of ideas and a moral philosophical evaluation.  
The article offers a terminological and epistemological grounding to the notions of terror and 
terrorism and provides an historical account of the phenomenon as it has evolved throughout the 
ages up to our present day. It highlights the significance of publicity and other socially relevant 
factors to terrorism and outlines both the mental and psychological characteristics of terrorist 
activity. The major part of the article is dedicated to delineating the nature of terrorist violence and 
its moral and legal implications. By way of a phenomenology of violence in the context of a 
concept of political justice, the fundamental ethical illegitimacy of terrorist violence is deduced. 
The article concludes with deliberations on the question of a universal set of ethics in both world 
religions and international law. It sheds light on the demanding dimension of combating terrorism 
for security affairs in this new century and particularly underscores the challenge to the 
democratic statutory state to fight the potentially inhumane without disclaiming the principles of 
humanity embodied in its own social order.  
The essay takes into account the current social as well as political debate around the subject of 
terrorism in both the United States and Europe, characterized by confusion and disorientation 
particularly as regards a moral evaluation of the terrorist phenomenon. The approach undertaken 
in this article offers an argument rooted deeply in Western philosophy as well as political thought, 
thus providing urgently needed illumination for further ethical orientation in both academia and 
public discourse. 
A History of Ideas and Philosophical-Ethical Reflections  
The events of September 11, 2001 notwithstanding, neither the UN nor the international circles of 
scientists, scholars, and politicians were able to find a consensual definition of terror and 
terrorism, terms that are on everybody’s mind ever since the massive terrorist attacks hit both 
Washington D.C. and New York. Moreover, it still seems to be a problem whether to specify 
terrorist activities as political manifestations or simply as illegitimate acts of criminals.  
One of the more comprehensive definitions of terrorism was provided by the U.S. Department of 
Defense. Its definition describes terrorism as “the unlawful or threatened use of force or violence 
against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve 
political, religious, or ideological objectives.”[1] As a point of departure for the analysis at hand 
which leaves room for unprejudiced consideration, the term ‘terrorism’ shall be defined as “a 
strategy whereby violence is used to produce certain effects in a group of people so as to attain 
some political end or ends.”[2] In any case, however, terrorism always refers to a minority of 
whatever kind intending to put through their political and social goals against established political 
structures by outright use of violent means.  
Terminological Clarifications  
While some authors and commentators use the terms ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ synonymously, 
others differentiate those terms in the sense that ‘terror’ refers to the use of terrorist means “from 
above,” so to say, deriving from the political power structures themselves, whereas the term 
‘terrorism’ is related to politically motivated violence “from below.”  
Following these etymological lines, terror can be defined as “the usage of the domain of 
intimidation by the powerful” while terrorism can be seen as “the counterfeiting and practice of 
methods of terror by those—for the time being still—“powerless, despised and desperate” who 
believe not to be taken seriously other than when resorting to terrorist violence.”[3]  
Both terror and terrorism demonstrate pronounced indifference toward the value of human life, 
imitate each other in their methods, and—in many cases—are even mutually dependent upon 
each other. In the past, for example, dictatorial systems have repeatedly tried to sell violations of 
human rights and brutal suppression of individual freedom as inevitable measures to uphold 
internal security and national stability.  
Terror (State Terrorism) as an Instrument “from Above”  
As a historically institutionalized system, terror reached one of its early peaks with the Jacobin 
(Terror-) Regime in France near the end of the eighteenth century. The leader of the French 
Revolution, Maximilien Robespierre himself, designated the terror applied by the regime as 
“virtuous” and emphasized: “Terror is nothing else but justice, immediate, unrelenting und 
unbending justice; thus terror is a manifestation of virtue.”[4]  
By the end of the revolutionary period, the “terror of revolution” is frequently found as a form of 
violence that, to quote Trotsky, “reduces all contradictions down to the sole alternative: Life or 
death.”[5] There are, therefore, justifiable reasons to understand and use the terms terror and 
terrorism synonymously—not the least of which is that the terrorism of the National Socialists 
during the Weimar Republic became a forerunner and, in fact, was the preparation for the terror 
of the Third Reich.  
Terrorism as an Instrument “from below”  
As already mentioned, the term terrorism refers to some kind of politically motivated threat and 
application of violence that leads repeatedly, especially in recent times, to severe disregard of the 
basic laws of humanity. It seems as though the arbitrary use of terrorist violence so prominent 
today does not discern the difference between protected persons or proscribed ammunitions. In 
the recent past, therefore, some prominent politicians have designated the fight against terrorism 
literally as “war.” In this context, both scientists and security experts (of different national 
background) warn against the rise of new, ever more radical forms of terrorism.  
Terrorists want to put pressure on the broad public by spreading fear and uncertainty until those 
in power—in the medium or long term—give in to the ideological and political claims of the 
perpetrators. Contemporary terrorism particularly fails to show any respect for age, sex, or 
descent of the indiscriminately picked victims of their attacks.  
Anarchical terrorism as well as political regime terror utilizes the application of violence for the 
purpose of spreading fear and intimidation in pursuing either nationalist or revolutionary goals. 
Whereas, on the one hand, national terrorism is aiming at getting rid of heteronymous 
governance, or attaining national independence or autonomy by way of illegal use of force, 
revolutionary terrorism, on the other hand, intends either to bring down a certain regime or wants 
to bring about a radical change in the existing political and societal order.  
However, terrorist groups can also go for both goals at the same time, as is being proven by the 
example of the Bask terrorist organization “Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna/ ETA” (Bask Homeland and 
Freedom), whose political arm is represented by the left-wing extremist party, “Herri Batsuna.”  
Terrorism and Guerilla Warfare  
What has been mentioned so far makes it quite conceivable that there is some similarity between 
terrorism and guerilla warfare, although the line of demarcation between them is somewhat 
blurred. The term ‘guerilla’ (in Spanish: small war) denotes, on the one hand, the fight of small 
(irregular) forces against a hostile armed force, occupational power, or its own government. On 
the other hand, the term is also used to designate those forces themselves. The border between 
terrorism and guerilla warfare, therefore, is especially blurred when terrorist groups are fighting 
for national goals. Thus in the case of revolutionary terrorism the terms frequently flow back and 
forth. The “Irish Republican Army (IRA),” for instance, describes its struggle against the British 
Forces literally as a guerilla war.[6]  
Terrorism and Publicity  
In order to confront the broad public with their political goals and ideologies, terrorist groups and 
organizations demand a level of renown. It is, therefore, primarily for the reason of gaining 
publicity that terrorists do not refrain from the most supreme sacrifices and cruelties, as they are 
well aware that the success of their intentions and beliefs is dependent on their impact on the 
public.  
This is why all conceivable moral or political motives and motivations that could possibly 
legitimize—thus, confine and constrain—a terrorist act of violence fall short against the publicist-
aesthetical impact they need to attain in order to succeed. In other words, one could say that—
irrespective of results, costs, and sacrifices—the drama justifies itself simply because of its 
exhibitionism. It is therefore primary “disgust and wrath,” which make foremost certain, rather 
than overt or covert admiration and sympathy, that “the news of terrorist acts and threats 
disseminates rapidly and widely.”[7]  
From this, a striking difference to regime terror becomes visible, as the terrorist never intends to 
draw the public’s (national as well as international) attention to its own activities. Very much to the 
contrary, this type of terrorism profoundly endeavors to conceal its violation of human rights.  
By the refusal of terror regimes to let their own political actions become public, such regimes 
prove impressively the immorality of what they do. As Immanuel Kant has made clear in the 
supplemental part of his work entitled “Perpetual Peace,” if one abstracts from all the material of 
public law (from the various empirically given relationships of men in the state, or of states to 
each other)  
“there remains only the form of publicity, the possibility of which is implied by every legal claim, 
since without it there can be no justice (which can only be conceived as publicly known) and thus 
no right, since it can be conferred only in accordance with justice.”[8]  
Thus, it is this “harmony which the transcendental concept of public right establishes between 
morality and politics” that seems to be the fundamental gauge for the moral worth of social and 
political actions.  
Most interestingly, with terrorism this phenomenon presents itself from the other side, as it were. 
Whilst terrorism is not bothered about either morality (moral law) or the public law that rests upon 
it, terrorism does not hesitate to go public with claims that are devoid of any moral or legal claim.  
Certainly, there is considerable difference between the measure of violence that the terrorists of 
our time are ready to apply and the terrorist violence of earlier epochs. Whereas the terrorist 
anarchists of the past were technically limited—provided they did not constrain themselves by 
self-imposed limitat ions—today’s terror activists appear to be bereft of any ethical considerations 
regarding the means and methods they are using. Due to this fact, and also because of the 
constantly growing destructive capacity of modern weapons and war materials, the threat of 
terrorism becomes ever more severe.  
Extensions of the Term Terrorism  
In the early 1990s, the term terrorism became extended by two new terms, namely “drug-
terrorism” and “gray -zone phenomenon.” Drug terrorism refers to the targeted use of drug 
trafficking by governments or terrorist organizations to reach political goals. The term gray-zone 
phenomenon is used to describe the threat against the stability of nation-states emanating from 
non-state actors as well as the destabilizing developments and impacts resulting from external 
non-governmental actors. These dimensions throw a light on the dynamically altering character of 
sub-national conflict as it arose to an ever increasing degree after the end of the Cold War.  
Tackling the phenomenon of terrorism must not leave aside another significant aspect that 
plays—or at least can play—a decisive role in the attempt to grasp the threat in its entirety. This 
aspect relates to the fact that terrorism has to be considered in many cases as a 
psychopathological phenomenon. It is not in a few cases that rational deliberations are missing; 
what is in the foreground as a driving motive is simply the urge, the passion to kill. In his book 
“The New Terrorism—Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction,” Walter Laqueur portrays 
the long ignored fact that has already been described in Wordsworth’s famous commentary on a 
Shakespeare play about the “motive hunting of a motiveless malignity,” with these words:  
“Some creed is usually needed—even blind rage has to find a focus—but how often could a 
terrorist of the extreme left, but for some biographical accident, say, the influence of a friend or 
some charismatic figure he encountered, have turned to the extreme right or some sectarian 
group, and vice versa?”[ 9]  
This makes more than clear that ideological motivation of whatever political or religious nature 
does not necessarily have to be the driving force behind terrorism.  
Observations on the History of Ideas and the Origins of Modern Terrorism  
Already in antiquity we find organized terrorist groups who tried to spread terror systematically. 
Terrorism as an attempt—by way of criminal violence—to generate fear on a broad scale to attain 
political goals, can thus look back on an ancient and long tradition. In the history of terrorist 
violence we find the members of an Islamic secret society who perpetrated their terror attacks 
between the eleventh and thirteenth century in the Middle East. This society, later called the 
Assassins (from the French ‘assassin’—murderer), was created by the Persian Hasan-I Sabbah. 
Subsequent to his conquest of the northern Persian fortification of Alamut in the year 1090, he 
and his followers threatened the Crusaders as well as Muslim sovereigns with murderous attacks 
carried out by his fanatic assassins. Although these ceased to be a major force, “their main 
contribution was perhaps originating the strategy of the terrorist disguised—taqfir, or deception—
as a devout emissary but in fact on a suicide mission, in exchange for which he was guaranteed 
the joys of paradise.”[10]  
Terrorism in the narrower, modern understanding goes back to the assaults and violent acts of 
the anarchists in the nineteenth century. One of the most prominent forerunners of modern-age 
terrorism is the Italian (Republican) extremist Carlo Pisacane. Initially belonging to the Italian high 
aristocracy, Pisacane turned away from his class, relinquished his related societal position and 
dedicated himself to a year-long fight against the Bourbons, until he finally, in 1857, lost his life in 
a failed revolt. To him is ascribed the apparition of the notion of “Propaganda of Action.”[11] The 
Italian extremist clearly articulated that the people have to be shaken up, and simultaneously fear 
among the enemies to the revolution has to be spread.  
Such ideas were particularly attractive to the revolutionary forces in Tsarist Russia. In the spirit of 
Pisacane, Michael Bakunin became another influential theoretician of terrorism in the nineteent h 
century. He was active not only in Russia, but also in Germany during the revolution of 1848-49; 
in France; and in Switzerland. In his Principles of Revolution, published in 1869, Bakunin made it 
clear that he and his friends would never accept any other method than destruction. The final goal 
is revolution because evil can only be terminated through violence; and Russian soil will only be 
cleansed by fire and sword. Furthermore, Bakunin wrote and published a Revolutionary 
Catechism in which he gave rules of conduct for terrorists. He coined the term, “anonymous 
terrorist,” referring to one who was supposed to radically break with society and deny all its laws, 
customs, and conventions. He advised the terrorists of his time to dispose of the most dangerous 
enemies (all those who were conspicuous because of their intelligence or particular talents) at the 
beginning. This was to terrify both the government and the people alike. Literally futuristic was his 
advice to cooperate closely with criminals and criminal organizations.[12]  
Revolutionary Terrorism in Tsarist Russia  
Prior to World War I, it was the Russian terrorists who dominated the scene and were also the 
most successful. The first organization to put the theories of Pisacane and Bakunin into practice 
was the Russian “Naradnaja Wolja” (People’s Will, sometimes also translated as People’s 
Freedom) founded in 1878. This consisted of a small group of Russian constitutionalists who 
stood in direct opposition to the Tsar’s reign. In the face of the “Apathy and Estrangement of the 
Russian masses” the members of the group attempted—by way of absolutely courageous 
deeds—to draw the public’s attention to the goals and ideals of the organization. However, in 
stark contrast to the terror organizations of the late twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first 
century that distinguish themselves by bloodshed and carnage on a large, indiscriminate scale, 
the Naradnaja Wolja took a particularly discriminating stance on the violence it applied. The 
Russian terrorists of those days transformed the “propaganda of violence” into assaults that were 
exclusively directed against individuals who were deemed to be “embodiments of the autocratic 
regime of repression.”[13]  
Nationalist Terrorism on the Balkans and in Ireland  
Terrorism was also believed by its early proponents to be able to determine the course of history. 
After the Austrians had taken power in the region, a group of Bosnian-Serb intellectuals, including 
university students and even high school pupils (later becoming known as the Mlada Bosnia or 
Young Bosnians), formed against the Hapsburg reign. One of their members, Gavrilo Princip, 
eventually triggered, through his assassination of the successor to the Austrian throne, Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand, on June 28, 1914, the chain of events that led to the outbreak of the First World 
War and the ensuing totally new political order in Europe. Behind the Young Bosnians stood the 
secret society “Narodna Odbrana” (Defense of the People), which was originally founded in 1908, 
to foster the Serbian cultural and national activities. However, it soon assumed a more 
pronounced political and subversive orientation and gained notoriety for terrorist activities against 
the Hapsburg Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Narodna Odbrana was able to recruit new 
members, especially among the young Bosnians and Herzegovinans, and it was not long until the 
terrorism of this group achieved ever higher levels of brutality. In 1911, the even more radical 
group “Crna Ruka” (Black Hand) split off from the Narodna Odbrana. Although there were 
originally close ties among the Serb military leadership, the Crna Ruka and the Young Bosnians, 
the relationship between these elements was not one of direct control or total manipulation. 
Rather, we have to assume a situation of mutual influence and interrelation. However, there is 
some indication that the Black Hand attempted to force Austria into measures against Serbia in 
order to drive both countries into war by assassinating the Archduke and successor to the 
Austrian throne.[14] But, irrespective of the correctness of this assumption, the events that led to 
the outbreak of World War I demonstrate how immense the impact of this “privatized” nationalist 
violence of terrorism can be at the highest level of global politics.  
After World War I, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was founded in 1919 as a Catholic 
underground organization, which was at the same time to represent the “armed arm” of the 
nationalist Irish Party Sinn Fein. Although a part of the IRA dissolved itself into the newly founded 
state of Ireland in 1921, the militant wing fought on until 1923 in order to achieve a total 
disconnection from Great Britain and the annexation of Northern Ireland. In the late 1920s, the 
IRA existed as a small armed group—forbidden in England as well as in Ireland—before sinking 
into oblivion for many years, until the second half of the twentieth century, when it gained new 
significance again. Ever since 1967, it has been involved in violent clashes close to civil war. The 
forceful confrontation with London eventually resulted in a split within the IRA. While the Marxist 
“Officials” were striving for a political solution to the Northern Ireland question, the Nationalist 
“Provisionals” continued to resort to terrorism. Subsequent to the declaration of a cease fire in 
1993 among Sinn Féin, the moderate Northern Ireland Catholics, and Great Britain, as well as 
subsequent to the launch of another peace process, the IRA joined in a cease fire agreement in 
August of 1994. Nevertheless, the year 1996 brought back new terrorist attacks and, in spite of 
another peace agreement between London and Sinn Féin in 1998, terrorism by IRA extremists 
remains an imminent threat.  
“Werwolf”  
Both terrorism and guerilla warfare joined hands during World War II. But it was not only to fight 
the troops of the German Wehrmacht; it was also the National Socialist leadership—particularly in 
the phase of the collapse of the Reich—that considered terrorist actions to be an appropriate 
means of fighting the war. Consequently, toward the end of the war, under the codename 
Werwolf, it commenced underground activities against the allied forces that can by all means, 
from today’s view, be called terrorism. The codename itself might have been taken from the novel 
by Hermann Löns titled Der Werwolf, published in 1910, which portrayed the “guerilla” war 
farmers and peasants from lower Saxony fought against regular armies during the Thirty-Years 
War.  
Terrorism for National Independence after 1945  
In the late 1940s and 1950s, terrorism re-emerged in connection with violent insurgencies against 
European Colonial powers. In fact, such different states as for example Algeria, Israel or Kenya 
owe their independency, to a not insignificant degree, to nationalist political movements using 
terrorism as a weapon against the colonial powers. Not to anyone’s surprise against this 
backdrop of violent de-colonization, the term terrorist was thrust aside by the “politically correct” 
term of “freedom fighter.” The new terminology somehow mirrored the recognition most of the 
liberation movements received by a large part of the international community.[15] In the course of 
this development we find the founding in 1964 of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
under Egyptian influence as a loose cover for several Palestine resistance groups. The goal was 
to establish an independent Arab state on the soil of the former British Mandate of Palestine, 
while terminating the state of Israel. It was the PLO president, Yassir Arafat, who expressed in a 
speech before the UN Assembly in 1974, what distinguished, in his opinion, a freedom fighter 
from a revolutionary or terrorist: “The difference between a revolutionary and a terrorist … lies in 
the reason for which he is fighting. Because the one who fights for a just cause and for the 
freedom and liberation of his own land in order to set it free from intruders and colonialists, can 
never be called a terrorist….”[16]  
What strikes one’s attention with this and similar positions of the past and present is the exclusive 
fixation on the question “Why.” In other words, what is significant is that the focus is being laid 
upon the aim and goal of revolutionary violence. The complex sphere of what in the broadest 
sense of the word can be understood as the “jus in bello”—i.e., the question about what means 
and methods are permitted and prohibited when it comes to the politically motivated use of 
violence—is neglected and entirely left out of the picture.  
Left Wing Terrorism in the Twentieth Century  
During the 1960s and 1970s, terrorism was almost exclusively represented by revolutionary 
terrorist organizations ideologically motivated from the left side of the political spectrum. As 
terrorist groups normally do, these groups tried to draw the world’s attention to their political goals. 
The Italian Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse) attempted to overthrow the existing societal order by 
brutal acts of terror among which assaults and kidnapping were most prominent. In the early 
seventies, it was the “Rote Armee Fraktion” (RAF), as the Baader-Meinhof-Gruppe called itself, 
which released a kind of mob-war against the then West German political establishment. When 
the major proponents of the RAF were incarcerated by 1972, several successor groups and 
sympathizing elements continued the fight by committing further terror attacks. The links between 
the social-revolutionary left wing terrorism and the Arab-nationalist terrorism were proven not 
least by the kidnapping of the Lufthansa airplane by Arab terrorists in 1977. Subsequent to the 
spectacular liberation of the hostages by the German Special Forces of “GSG 9” in 
Mogadishu/Somalia, several alleged RAF-terrorists committed suicide in the correction facility at 
Stammheim.  
Religious Terrorism as a New Threat  
In the 1990s a new generation of terrorists emerged, committing ever more dangerous violent 
acts inspired by religious motives. Islamic extremists, “bible-prone” right wingers, and “Judgment 
Day” sectarians pursue irrational goals through irrational means. The Japanese sect under its 
then leader Socko Azaharah used chemical weapons in its assault on the Tokyo underground in 
1995. This terrorist chemical attack resulted in twelve deaths and five thousand-five-hundred 
injured people. Die Aum Sekt dedicated itself to a “theology of destruction,” aiming at the creation 
of a new “race of superior man” (quite naturally built by the members of this movement) who were 
to re-generate the remnants of a post-apocalyptical world. The “global reign” the Aum had in mind 
may serve as an example for possible followers in the future.  
The radical Islamic (Shiite) organization “Hisbollah” (Party of God), on the other hand, fights for 
the termination of the state of Israel, as well as for the foundation of an Islamic divine state 
following the image of Iran. The terrorist organization “Hamas” (Devotion), also wants to demolish 
the state of Israel and erect the Islamic state of Palestine. What is common to the internationally 
operating Islamic terrorist organizations is their shared goal of fighting and bringing down the “big 
Satan,” the United States.[17]  
On the Mental Foundation and Psychic Manifestation of Terrorism  
At the bottom of the various forms of terrorism—as it is the case with any political, social or 
religious movement that stipulates a totalitarian claim—lies a physically as well as psychically 
constructed struggle against plurality. It seems to be essential, however, to distinguish a “mental 
fundamentalism” from an “operating fundamentalism.” In the permanent mental dispute between 
culturally, religiously and politically motivated ideas and values, we have to distinguish the one 
who is convinced by his attitudes, but who is nevertheless tolerant toward those holding different 
values, from the one who attempts to enforce his convictions upon others by political and social 
realization.  
It is for this reason that several commentators have introduced the distinction between 
“fundamentalism” and “integralism” in order to suggest these differences in thinking and acting. In 
the German-speaking realm, the foremost philosopher to emphasize this differentiation is Robert 
Spaemann.[18] In Spaemann’s view, “fundamentalism” represents an ideology based on a solid 
and hierarchical system of values, which tries to persuade by dialogue while basically being 
tolerant toward other value systems. “Integralism,” in contrast, encompasses all ideological 
orientations that attempt to achieve their beliefs and convictions by use of physical or psychical 
violence in the here and now.  
Thus, generally speaking, we may comprehend more or less all collectivistic-totalitarian systems 
as integralisms. The French philosopher Andre Glucksmann is of the opinion that what happened 
during the twentieth century and what is continuing into the twenty-first, has to be viewed as part 
of the permanent struggle between the various forms of integralism—as the violent manifestation 
of fundamentalist thinking—against the open Western societies. “The goal of integralism is 
always de-structuralization, aiming at the destruction of Western society.”[19] Glucksmann not 
only mentions the Islamist integralism but also the totalitarian ideologies of National Socialism 
and Marxism-Leninism. In this “mental chaos,” Glucksmann observes a basic struggle between 
the various kinds of Integralism, on the one hand, and the democratic-pluralistic societies of the 
West, on the other. Collectivistic-ideological groups and parties set up the breeding ground for 
mental as well as physical forms of terrorism. The radical Left of the West, to name but one 
example, has ever since 1968 sworn itself to an equalizing Marxist dogmatism that aspires 
toward a revolution of values that paves the way for spiritual totalitarianism. The value-arbitrary 
society is consequently not an open but rather a deeply inhuman society based upon the might of 
the powerful.  
Moral-Philosophical Reflections and Ethical and Legal Implications of 
Terrorist Violence  
Among the most controversial problems of the political world today we detect the justification of 
the principles and actions of political justice. The chance for conflict—politically speaking, the 
chance for war—simultaneously determines the problem of peace. This challenge has to be seen 
in the diverse claims for freedom of individuals, interest-groups, and of social, political and 
religious nations, states, and state-coalitions, indeed, entire cultures, which have to be reconciled 
and, if feasible, peacefully arranged.  
Terrorist deeds ground themselves without exception in a “pre-juridical” or, to speak with Kant, 
“moral-juridical” realm. Only a moral philosophical reflection on terrorism and the incentives and 
goals of terrorist actions, therefore, may enable us to finally answer the decisive question: “Are 
terrorism and terrorist actions morally and ethically justifiable?”  
The instrument of terrorism, the path along which terrorism walks to attain to its goals, is unlimited 
application of violence, a direct physical (in an indirect way frequently also psychic) form of 
violence, tendentiously devoid of any self-imposed limitations and confinements. (Compare 
Graphic Annex 1, “Structure of Violence”). Hence, the question about the moral vindication of 
terrorist actions can be equated with the essential question for the legitimate use of violence and 
force to put through political and ideological goals.  
Morality and Violence  
The notion of violence in the physical meaning of “violentia” explicitly refers to the application of 
physical power and strength to an individual or his material property against his will. Long ago, 
already Aristotle reflected on violence as a force imposed upon a victim without this individual 
directly contributing to this effect or being able to withdraw from it. The one who has to suffer this 
impact of this force has no choice except to endure this misery. Such an act of violence thus 
represents a deed that runs counter to the victim’s inclinations and wellbeing.[20] This aspect is 
especially in the foreground of terrorist action, as terrorism does not forebear to risk the lives and 
physical wellbeing of innocent people who are not the least related to the violence and force used 
against them.  
In the abstract, violence can be defined as the forceful encroachment upon the sphere of one 
individual’s legitimate development of his free will. This makes it to conceive why the question of 
right and wrong is determined from the perspective of the victim who has to sustain a restraining 
and debilitating effect on his organism and thus its free self-development. This direct idea of 
violence comprises a clear relation between a perpetrator and a victim, with the perpetrator 
directly inflicting damage on the victim. This damage primarily violates the victim’s organism or its 
free self-determination.  
Physical force finds its most profound manifestation in armed conflict and war. Criminal violence 
certainly comes closest to it. Nevertheless, terrorist violence—not only because of the self-
awareness of the terrorist that he is “at war,” but also because of the extent of damage inflicted by 
terrorist actions—should be categorized as war-like violence. It is, therefore, for this part of the 
investigation, reasonable to define terrorist violence as a form of crime or as an act similar to war.  
Normatively speaking, injustice is the confinement of one’s development of freedom without the 
existence of an external necessity. In this philosophical sense, external necessity can only be 
thought as a morally justifiable reason simply because in a possible moral and ethical framework 
of actions where the application of violence and force comes into play, just by rational conclusion, 
only actions are conceivable in which force appears either together with (moral) injustice, with 
(moral) justice or—as sanctioning and punishing power—in connection with positive, statutory 
national or international law.  
If we leave aside the latter point insofar as terrorism positions itself extra legem anyway, what is 
left for closer examination is the question if terrorist violence can be morally justified at all and, 
under what conditions and criteria, if any, it can claim morality and moral legitimacy.  
Force and (Political) Justice  
Let me emphasize again: Injustice emerges when the development of the freedom of an 
individual or group of individuals is being constrained by another or others, without the existence 
of a morally justifiable necessity. The borderline at which right passes over into wrong exactly 
marks the line of demarcation at which we encounter the normative idea of justice. From the 
viewpoint of a merely rational deduction, the notion of (individual, social, political, intrastate, 
interstate …) justice becomes the normative, cardinal aspect of ethics, transforming into “the 
inevitable criterion for any claim that wishes to correspond with the idea of morality.”[21]  
The category of justice, therefore, embodies the only parameter that can be reconciled with the 
rights of the subject, the predominance of the individual including his claim for self-determination, 
and also with the guiding image of modern philosophy and ethics, freedom.  
A violation of the guiding principle of ethics, justice—practically, the commitment of injustice—
must, therefore, stem from exaggerated egotism, an over-emphasized affirmation of one’s own 
will, which negates the sphere of right of another individual, in the sense of not taking into 
account the legitimate development of another’s free will.  
According to this depiction, which introduces right and wrong as moral categories and relates 
them to “man as man,” we are being offered a perspective which, bare of any statutory or societal 
superstructure, allows us to approach the subject matter in a culture-invariant and truly universal 
way.  
It is precisely on this level that we can easily define human rights: Everybody has the right of not 
being constrained in the development of his or her own free will (the affirmation of his body and 
life). Nobody has the right to hamper others in the development of their freedom. The freedom of 
any one person finds its natural limit at the point where it constrains the freedom of any other 
person. These normative principles of justice find their most succinct formulation in Immanuel 
Kant’s definition of (moral) right:  
“The whole of conditions under which the voluntary actions of any one person can be harmonized 
in reality with the voluntary actions of every other person, according to the universal law of 
freedom.”[22]  
This moral-philosophical fixing of the cardinal ethical gauge also establishes the borderline up to 
which an individual (a community, a society, a state …) may carry on with its development of 
freedom without negating the legitimate self-determination of another individual entity. 
Simultaneously, the actions are being defined which, in transgression of this borderline, have to 
be designated as unjust and morally illegitimate and whose rejection and warding off can be 
morally justified.  
In almost everything they do, humans find themselves in a social, political and societal framework 
of interaction. Thus every ethically relevant decision stands in an interactive context, and pertains 
to an external result that is invariably linked to the weal and woe of other human beings or a 
community in the narrower or wider sense of the word. Although the result of a deed—in the case 
of an unjust act the suffering of injustice—is of importance, we must nevertheless accept that it is 
primarily the incentive and motivation, the intrinsic meaning of an action, that decides the ethical 
value of an action and determines the right and wrong inherent in it.  
At this level of abstraction we can easily grasp that a violent act can only be morally justified 
when it bears a reactive character, in the sense of the warding off a positive act of injustice in the 
normative meaning described above. A mere rational deliberation a priori gives proof that the 
warding off of such an action—very much in contrast to this action itself—may claim moral 
legitimacy. This rational law is: “Causa causae est causa effectus.”[23] This principle tells us 
nothing else than whatever the one who is exposed to injustice undertakes to ward off injustice 
and to re-establish just conditions, the one who commits the unjust act must ascribe to himself 
what happens to him as a result.  
It is exactly within this ethical pattern of the relation between right and wrong where terrorism 
finds itself; for the terrorist always tries to legitimize his use of violence as inevitably necessary to 
alter the unjust social or political conditions as he perceives them.  
As shown above, a course of conduct provoked by an aggressor in reaction to an assault in order 
to protect oneself has to be considered as being legitimate, inasmuch as this course of action 
would not have taken place without the positive act of aggression. It is for this reason that the 
defense and warding off must bear different moral quality than the aggression itself because it is 
exactly following from it. Consequently, a major feature of the legitimate application of physical 
force must have to be seen in the factor of inevitability and unavoidability. In this context, however, 
there is a danger that the amount of physical force necessary to ward off the aggression may be 
exaggerated. Therefore, the moral legitimacy of the use of force is closely linked to another 
ethical principle, the principle of proportionality.  
Short of a more or less direct relation between perpetrator and victim, the principle of appropriate 
and proportionate usage of means is at the core of moral and ethical consideration when it comes 
to the legitimization of forceful actions.  
The Ethical Illegitimacy of Terrorist Violence  
It is not only that the terrorist disregards the inevitable principle of the immediacy of perpetrator-
victim relation, and the issues of inevitability and unavoidability, as well as the proportionality of 
means, but he bases his actions upon a pattern of causal rectification that can never be ethically 
justified, and thus has to be classified as morally illegitimate. To finally clarify the conditions of 
factual or presumed injustice against which forceful means might be used—and why terrorist 
violence never meets these criteria and thus embodies moral wrong in every case—makes it 
inevitable to analyze the sphere of wrong and injustice in greater detail.  
When it comes to decisions relevant to human actions, man finds himself always in a dilemma in 
the sense of conflicting interests, which can be resolved only by a consideration of interests 
according to ethical principles. Related to the question of an order of priority between possible 
goods and values that have a bearing on a morally relevant decision, it is Franz Böckle who 
introduces a helpful differentiation by distinguishing the principle of “Fundamentality” from the 
principle of “Dignity. ”[24] The principle of fundamentality, on the one hand, favors that good which 
is a necessary precondition for the realization of another one. The principle of dignity, on the 
other hand, structures the values according to their meaningfulness, and brings the fundamental 
goods in a moral and ethical context of meaningful priorities. Goods are physical entities existing 
independently of our individual intentions, however, goods are given to us as indispensable 
factors for our responsible actions. These factors include our physical integrity, mental or physical 
property, in addition, also institutional dimensions of life, such as matrimony, family, and state. 
Values, in contrast, are certain stereotyped attitudes or virtues, which can only be considered real 
inasmuch as they are qualities of human volition; for example the subjective understanding of 
justice, faith, or solidarity. Consequently, whenever a morally relevant deed is demanded, the 
acting individual finds himself in a situation of choice. He has to choose between values and 
goods that are in a permanent constellation of competition among each other. The human being, 
thus, finds himself always in a dilemma as to which option he should choose in the constantly 
conflicting set of alternatives. Viewed negatively, an ethical choice inevitably means to choose the 
lesser of two evils.  
These helpful considerations can now, through the insights of Wolfgang Kersting, be placed into 
the context of the philosophy of international relations, within which terrorism is acting. Kersting 
introduces a distinction between programmatic and transcendental rights (claims for freedom). 
Transcendental rights—following Kant’s definition of ‘transcendental’ as being the condition of 
experience at all—are immediate human rights such as the right to live and enjoy physical 
integrity, which are the conditions necessary for the possibility to experience other rights and 
freedoms anyway. Beside these transcendental primary rights, we find then the programmatic 
rights. These are, so to say, secondary rights, such as political self-determination, democratic 
living conditions, just distribution of goods etc.[25] It is precisely here, where terrorism does not 
take these rights into account (or intentionally or unintentionally disregards these normative 
principles), that terrorism becomes devoid of any serious ethics. Terrorism does not hesitate to 
make secondary rights, such as political self-determination, or the implementation of a desired 
political or social order, absolute—at the cost of ignoring and neglecting primary (transcendental) 
rights. In doing so terrorism not only turns the logical principle of the predominance of 
transcendental rights upside down, it also negates the predominant fundamental right to live, as 
this plays no role in terrorist rationales—neither in the sense of being a physical cause or motive 
to reflect its own maxim.  
We have to ascribe, therefore, the utmost moral quality to the statement made by the General 
Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, when he said, in the light of the September 11, 2001, 
incident: “No just cause can be advanced by terrorism.” Politically offensive use of force to 
achieve national interests, revolutionary fanaticism, or the attempt to rectify war as a legitimate 
means to disseminate religious or political ideologies in the sense of a “Holy War,” can, from a 
higher normative position of moral philosophy, never be justified.[26] Attempts to vindicate these 
strategies inevitably end up in dogmatism, which can never live up to the scrutiny of an ethics that 
is based upon an adequate, humanistic image of man. Terrorist activity violates the essential 
norms of ethical thinking and acting and thus must, by all means, be designated as the sheer 
ideal type of the “manifestation of moral injustice” in the social and political realms.  
Universal Ethics in World Religions and International Law  
A significant number of religious leaders, scholars and theologians have arrived at the conclusion 
that the ethical doctrines of all great religious systems are in accordance regarding the major 
issues of ethics. “They all forbid, like the Mosaic Decalogue, to kill, to lie, to steal or to commit 
adultery, as these stipulations are the prerequisite to any orderly social life.”[27] It is a 
characteristic of the ethics of all high religions that they connect moral claims with religious 
doctrines and rituals. Once again it is Kant who considers moral ingredients to be the most 
important of these three components to any religion and brings all religions back to morality as 
their true foundation.[28]  
In the field of humanity—especially in its concrete formations in humanitarian law and the human 
rights codes of international law—we find ourselves on common ground, at least between the 
three monotheistic religious denominations. With regard to human rights, to mention but one 
example, (even it still seems to exist on paper only), there is a surprising consensus to be found. 
The Council of the Arab League, on September 15, 1994, passed a resolution that proclaimed the 
Arab Charter of Human Rights. This catalogue of norms—although hitherto not in effect—
comprises all of the fundamental and basic rights that are found in the UN Charter or in the 
Human Rights Convention of the European Council, such as the prohibition of discrimination, the 
right for living, freedom and security, the prohibition of torture, the right to enjoy freedom of faith, 
speech and religion, etc. The Arab Charter of Human Rights thus signals the basic readiness of 
the Arab world to acknowledge all those basic values and liberties that emerged especially in the 
Western world as a result of the rational movement of enlightenment. Naturally, this formal 
coherence should not deceive us about the fact that this Christian-Occidental ethics is based 
upon a specific image of man and a specific understanding of human rights that still awaits its 
realization in the social and political practice of the Islam world and other regions on this planet.  
Prospects and Perspectives  
Everything suggests that terrorism and combating terrorism will represent a major dimension in 
security affairs of this new century. A specific challenge to the democratic statutory state arises 
from the fact that the potentially inhumane will have to be fought without disclaiming the principles 
of humanity embodied in the own social order.  
The guiding image of Western philosophical as well as political thought, the idea of the human 
being as an individualized person and the human rights principles resting upon it, may not be 
relinquished for a hysteria triggered by diverse ideologies and ideologists of conspiracy. 
Nevertheless, the postulate of abiding by humanity must stand on equal terms with the 
requirement to wage an efficient and effective war against international terrorism.  
In pursuing this course, the international community needs to find some kind of unity in terms of 
thinking and acting in the first place. At the center of an effective fight against terrorism is the 
following challenge that will have to be met: How can the inter-cultural relativism of fundamental 
values be overcome without destroying intra-cultural diversity and independency? The fact is that 
such a relativism of values is not only intellectually and morally untenable, but furthermore 
politically problematic to the extent that it seems unbearable, if not impossible for mankind, to 
exist with its consequences in the long haul.  
I can see no other way to overcome this ethical relativism than to find a consensus on 
fundamental values that is based upon the leading values of the European-Western culture. If the 
major forces join in, a process could be launched at the end of which there stands a moral, 
supranational (supra-cultural, supra-religious) social contract, providing for an internationally 
acknowledged, minimal institution for ethical orientation. In respect to the subject matter 
discussed here, this basic global ethical norm would primarily serve to define the moral criteria for 
the use of political and non-political force.  
Thus it could even be said that a “Globalization” of the most profound ethical norms—binding for 
humanity across all boundaries of culture, politics and religion—seems to be an inevitable claim 
for future international arrangements.   
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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